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Anyone who has spent time in a developing country knows the importance of social connections. 
Among their many roles, these connections help individuals land jobs, and provide them with 
credit and other forms of support. At first glance, it would appear that connections distort the 
economy by giving select individuals an unfair advantage. However, modern economics has 
another explanation for this phenomenon, which turns this view on its head. When markets 
function imperfectly, networks of socially connected individuals can form to enhance economic 
efficiency. For example, when the ability of new hires cannot be observed by the firm, 
incumbent workers will refer competent members of their community to their employers. These 
new hires will not let down the workers that referred them, and will work diligently, to avoid the 
social sanctions they would face from their network if they were caught shirking. Social 
connections solve information and commitment problems in this example. 
 Unlike information networks, which can be organized around casual acquaintances or 
even anonymous on-line communities, networks that solve commitment problems must be based 
on strong social ties to support the sanctions that are needed to maintain cooperative behavior 
(Karlan et al. 2009, Dhillon et al. 2014). Commitment networks will thus typically be organized 
around close-knit communities that have been in place for long periods of time, sometimes 
spanning multiple generations. Depending on the context, these communities could be based on 
kinship (e.g.; castes in India and clans in sub-Saharan Africa) or on geographical proximity 
(neighborhoods or villages). Members of these well-established communities will work together 
to successfully achieve common objectives, sacrificing immediate individual gain when they are 
sufficiently patient and when the threat of social sanctions is sufficiently severe. 
 Although community networks may improve outcomes for their members, a major 
limitation of these informal institutions is that their benefits are restricted to select populations. 
For example, individuals from a small number of communities that have established business 
networks (by historical good-fortune) will receive the credit and support that they need to start a 
new business. However, many, more deserving, individuals from other communities will be shut 
out. This misallocation of resources and talents when community networks are active was first 
documented by Banerjee and Munshi (2004). It explains, in part, why less efficient firms may 
continue to operate in developing economies (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). It also has obvious 
consequences for the dynamics of development. 
 When credit markets function imperfectly, modern growth theory tells us that wealth 
inequality can persist over many generations (Galor and Zeira 1993, Banerjee and Newman 
1993). Once networks are added to the mix, new opportunities for mobility open up at the level 
of the community. Members of communities that are fortuitously able to establish new networks 
work together to overcome credit and other constraints, moving as a group to new locations and 
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new occupations (Munshi 2011). The dynamics of the wealth distribution in the overall 
population will now be more complex, with networks forming and dissipating within and across 
communities over the course of the development process. How this process actually unfolds will 
depend not only on the initial wealth distribution, but also on the community structure and the 
exogenous sequence of events that triggers the formation of new networks, and this will vary 
from country to country. 
 My objective in this paper is to lay the groundwork for a new network-based theory of 
economic development. The first step is to establish that community-based networks are active 
throughout the developing world. There is plenty of anecdotal and descriptive evidence 
supporting this claim. However, showing that these networks actually improve the economic 
outcomes of their members is more of a challenge. Over the course of the paper I will present 
multiple strategies that have been employed to directly or indirectly identify network effects. The 
second step is to move beyond a static role for community networks, solving commitment 
problems and improving the outcomes of their members in the short-run, to examine how these 
informal institutions can support group mobility. A voluminous literature documents the 
involvement of communities in internal and international migration, both historically and in the 
contemporary economy. As with the static analysis, the challenge here is to show statistically 
that community networks directly support the movement of groups of individuals. I will show 
how restrictions from the theory can be used to infer a link between networks and migration in 
very different contexts. 
 While community networks may provide important group benefits to their members, 
these benefits may come with undesirable welfare consequences. Individuals belonging to other 
communities may be shut out of new employment opportunities. Individual mobility could, 
moreover, be severely restricted in existing networks. The third step in laying the groundwork 
for the new theory is to provide empirical support for this aspect of network-based development, 
namely that independent individual mobility will be constrained, both in communities where 
networks have formed as well as in other communities. I will draw on recent research from India 
(Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, 2014) to support this claim, connecting the new theory of 
network-based development to the emerging literature on misallocation. Having laid the 
groundwork for the new theory, this paper concludes by discussing how the standard growth 
model could be augmented to incorporate community networks, and what consequences these 
additions might have for our understanding of the development process. 
  
Community Networks in Developing Economies 
Social networks are a ubiquitous feature of developing economies. One very visible role for 
networks is to support business activity, with a small number of communities typically 
dominating trade and manufacturing. For example, expatriate Indian communities dominated 
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East African business during and after colonial rule, until their members were forced to leave in 
the 1970’s. Ethnic Chinese have controlled business in South East Asia for centuries. And the 
same story is true in India, the setting for a number of studies discussed in this paper, where a 
small number of Hindu castes and non-Hindu communities have historically dominated and 
continue to dominate business activity (Gadgil 1959, Nafziger 1971). 
 This concentration of business activity in the hands of a few communities does not, 
however, imply that opportunities are never available to outsiders. Indeed, all the communities 
listed above took advantage of fortuitous historical events to make their start in business. Indians 
took advantage of British colonial rule to enter business in East Africa, while communities such 
as the Bohris and the Parsis did the same in India. More recently, Damodaran (2008) describes 
how a number of agricultural castes have taken advantage of the restructuring of the Indian 
economy over the past three decades to move into business. This group mobility will be central 
to the discussion on network-based development that follows. For the moment, it suffices to note 
that business activity continues to be heavily networked in developing countries, with supporting 
evidence provided by studies from Vietnam (McMillan and Woodruff 1999), India (Munshi 
2011), and various countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Fafchamps 1996, 1999, 2003, Fisman 2003). 
 A second role for social networks in developing economies is to find and secure jobs for 
their members. To take one example, numerous accounts by contemporary observers and an 
extensive social history literature indicate that friends and kin from the origin community in 
Europe helped secure jobs for migrants to the American Midwest in the nineteenth century and 
the first quarter of the twentieth century when this region was developing (Conzen 1976, 
Hoerder 1991). As discussed in greater detail below, African-American networks were also 
forming in northern cities at this time. And, halfway around the world, caste-based labor market 
networks were forming in the Indian cities that grew under British colonial rule. The presence of 
these networks has been documented in Mumbai’s textile mills (Gokhale 1957), docks (Cholia 
1941), railway workshops (Burnett-Hurst 1925), and transportation facilities (Chandravarkar 
1994). 
 Although the networks described above may no longer be active, they have evolved or 
have been replaced by new networks. Labor market networks continue to be active in cities 
throughout the world, most often among migrant populations. Depending on the context, these 
networks can be organized around the family, the kin group (caste or clan), the origin village, or 
the destination neighborhood. Once the networks have established a niche in the destination 
economy, they will consolidate their position over time, making it difficult for newcomers to 
enter. However, new groups are nevertheless continually entering the labor market in these 
economies, with this process of group mobility described in greater detail below. For the 
moment, it suffices to note that labor markets in developing countries continue to be heavily 
networked, as documented, for example, in studies from China (Bian 1994, Zhang and Li 2003, 
Giles, Park, and Cai 2006, Wang 2012), South Africa (Magruder 2010), and India (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig 2006). 
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 A third role for social networks in developing economies is to provide social insurance 
for their members. Traditional agrarian economies are characterized by wide fluctuations in 
income. Under these conditions, risk-averse individuals benefit substantially from institutions 
that smooth their consumption. Without access to market credit or government safety nets, 
mutual insurance arrangements naturally emerge within well-established communities. The 
commitment problem that arises in such arrangements is that individuals with a positive income 
shock in a given period, who must make a transfer to individuals who received a negative shock, 
will be tempted to renege on their obligation. The threat of exclusion from the insurance 
arrangement in the future will sometimes be sufficient to deter such deviations from cooperative 
behavior. However, additional pressure may be required, which typically takes the form of social 
sanctions. Well-established communities are well positioned to implement such social sanctions. 
Not surprisingly, insurance networks are organized around close-knit social groups throughout 
the world; as for example, in India (Townsend 1994, Ligon 1998, Mazzocco and Saini 2012, 
Munshi and Rosenzweig 2014), the Philippines (Fafchamps and Lund 2003), Mexico 
(Angelucci, Di Giorgi, and Rasul 2014), and Cote d’Ivoire (Grimard 1997).   
 The central thesis of the new literature on informal institutions is that these institutions 
provide a range of benefits and services to their members when markets function imperfectly. To 
document the benefits that social networks provide their members, it is first necessary to define 
the relevant community; i.e. the population from which the network is drawn. In China, urban 
networks appear to be restricted to relatives and friends (Bian 1994, Zhang and Li 2003, Wang 
2012). In sub-Saharan Africa and India, more elaborate networks are organized at the level of the 
clan and the caste, respectively (Luke and Munshi 2005, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, 2014). 
In Mexico and the United States, the village or neighborhood appears to be the social unit around 
which networks are organized (Massey et al. 1987, Munshi 2003, Sampson et al. 1997). 
Although individuals select into networks, the domain of the community is treated as 
predetermined in most analyses of networks. Examples from India feature prominently in the 
discussion that follows, so it will be useful at this point to introduce the reader to the Indian caste 
system and the caste-community around which networks are organized in that country. 
 The caste system is a distinctive feature of Indian society. A central tenet of this system is 
that individuals must marry within their own (sub) caste or jati. Non-Hindu communities follow 
the same rules of endogamous marriage, as do converts to Christianity who continue to marry 
within their original jatis. Sample surveys from rural and urban India indicate that close to 95% 
of  Indian marriages continue to follow these traditional rules (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, 
2014, Munshi 2011, Luke and Munshi 2011). The longevity of the caste system has been the 
subject of intense debate, with some social scientists arguing that this system was put in place as 
recently as the colonial period as a way of dividing the native population (de Zwart 2000). 
Recent genetic evidence, however, indicates that the rules of endogamous marriage were put in 
place 1900-4200 years ago, and that the Indian population today consists of 4,635 distinct 
genetic groups (Moorjani et al. 2013). A dense web of marriage ties, formed over many 
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generations, links members of each caste (directly or indirectly) to each other. The spatial 
segregation by caste that continues to characterize the Indian village further strengthens local 
caste connections. Not surprisingly, networks serving different functions have historically been 
organized, and continue to be organized, around the caste in India. What distinguishes caste 
networks from networks in other countries is their scope (extending over multiple villages) and 
their size (consisting of thousands of individuals). I will return to this point towards the end of 
the paper when linking social structure to the dynamics of development. For the moment, we will 
focus on the static benefits that (caste) networks provide their members. 
The first role played by caste networks, going back many centuries, would have been to 
provide mutual insurance for their members. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2014) use data from the 
Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS), conducted at multiple points in time over the past 
four decades, to show that transfers from caste members are important and preferred mechanisms 
through which consumption is smoothed in rural India. Participation in caste-based insurance is 
relatively high, with 25 percent of the households in the 1982 survey and 20 percent in 1999 
reporting that they gave or received caste transfers (gifts or loans) in the year prior to the survey. 
We will see momentarily that an important role for the caste networks is to help households meet 
major contingencies like illness or marriage, which are relatively infrequent. The fraction of 
participating households would thus expand significantly if the time-window was increased from 
one to five, or even ten, years. The amount received is 20-40% of the receiving household’s 
annual income. This is a substantial amount and so multiple households will support a receiving 
household when it is in need of support. Consistent with this view, sending households 
contribute 5-8 percent of their annual income on average.  
 Transfers include gifs and loans. Despite the fact that loans account for just 23 percent of 
all within-caste transfers by value, we see in Table 1 that caste loans make up 14 percent of the 
total credit received by households in the year prior to the 1982 survey. Caste loans are the 
dominant source of informal (non-bank) credit, exceeding the amount received from 
moneylenders, friends, and employers. They are the dominant source of finance, across all 
sources including the bank, for meeting contingencies. Data from the 2005 Indian Human 
Development Survey (IHDS), reported in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2014), indicate that these 
credit patterns have remained relatively stable over time. One reason why caste loans have 
maintained their importance is because they are obtained on easier terms than other sources of 
credit. Munshi and Rosenzweig report that over 20% of caste loans by value require no interest 
payment and no collateral (as is true for all gifts, which account for the bulk of within-caste 
transfers).  
While caste-based rural insurance networks might have been in place for centuries, 
urbanization in India is a relatively recent phenomenon. When cities started to grow under 
colonial rule in the 18th and 19th centuries, the new networks that formed were also organized 
around the caste, supporting the movement of rural-urban migrants and finding them jobs once 
they arrived (Morris 1965, Chandravarkar 1994, Rudner 1994). This widespread use of caste-
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based networks led to the fragmentation of urban labor markets along caste lines, as described 
above for Mumbai city. Although most historical accounts of caste-based networking in Indian 
cities are situated prior to independence in 1947, a few studies conducted over the subsequent 
decades in India indicate that these patterns persisted over many generations. For example, Patel 
(1963) surveyed 500 mill workers in Mumbai in 1961-62 and found that 81% had relatives or 
members of their caste in the textile industry. 50% of the workers got jobs in the mills through 
the influence of their relatives and 16% through their friends, many of whom would have 
belonged to the same caste. Forty years later, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) surveyed the 
parents of school children residing in the same area of the city. 68% of the fathers employed in 
working class occupations reported that they received help from a relative or member of their 
caste in finding their first job, while 44% of fathers in white-collar occupations reported such 
help.  
Labor market networks are active throughout the world, and similar referral patterns have 
been documented in other economies. For example, Rees (1966) reports that informal sources 
accounted for 80% of all hires in blue-collar occupations and 50% of all hires in white-collar 
occupations in an early study set in Chicago. We would expect social ties to play an even 
stronger role for migrants in the U.S. Indeed, over 70% of the undocumented Mexicans, and a 
slightly higher proportion of the Central Americans, that Chavez (1992) interviewed in 1986 
found work through referrals from friends and relatives. Similar patterns have been found in 
contemporary studies of Salvadoran immigrants (Menjivar 2000), Guatemalan immigrants 
(Hagan 1994), and Chinese immigrants (Nee 1972, Zhou 1992). Individual respondents in the 
Mexican Migration Project, discussed in greater detail below, were asked how they obtained 
employment on their last visit to the United States; relatives (35%) and friends or paisanos from 
the origin village in Mexico (35%) account for the bulk of job referrals.  
 
Estimating Network Effects 
The preceding discussion provides examples of the direct benefits – mutual insurance and job 
referrals – that networks provide their members. These benefits are not restricted to caste 
networks and are even observed in developed economies, as described above for the United 
States. However, there will be many contexts in which individual outcomes and community 
clustering can be separately observed, but direct information on community support is 
unavailable. Consider the clustering by a small number of communities in business that is 
observed throughout the developing world. One interpretation of these community clusters is that 
they are active networks, with firms belonging to these networks supporting each other from one 
generation to the next. A second interpretation is that community networks support first-
generation businessmen. Once a community has established itself in business, from the next 
generation onward, individuals inherit the business, the connections, and the capital from their 
fathers, and so can operate independently. We would observe a positive correlation between a 
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firm’s performance and the numbers of firms from its community (a standard measure of 
network size) in either case, but this correlation would be spurious if the second interpretation 
was valid. The size of the community cluster would simply proxy for the number of generations 
that its member-firms had been in business in that case. To identify the effect of the network on 
individual or firm performance, more sophisticated research designs are required. 
Panel data can be used to control for fixed firm or individual characteristics, in which 
case we would be effectively studying the effect of changes in the size of the community 
network on change in firm performance. However, this would create a new problem, with 
changes in network size proxying for changes in the environment that directly determine 
performance. Continuing with the business example, firms would exit the business when times 
are bad. It could thus appear as if a decline in network size results in a decline in the performance 
of the firms that remain, when in fact the correlation is spurious once again. The same 
identification problem would arise if we estimated the relationship between network size and 
labor market outcomes with panel data. In addition to firm or individual fixed effects, a statistical 
instrument is needed that predicts changes in network size but does not directly determine 
outcomes. 
Munshi (2003) shows how this can be done in the context of Mexican labor networks in 
the United States. Migration from Mexico tends to be recurrent, with individuals working in the 
U.S. for spells of 3-4 years and then returning. Panel data from the Mexican Migration Project 
(MMP) can be used to study the labor market outcomes (employment, job-type) over multiple 
spells in the U.S. for a sample of individuals drawn from different Mexican origin communities 
(villages). The basic idea is to assess whether these individuals do better in spells where they 
have access to a larger network of migrants from their origin community in Mexico. To test this 
hypothesis, Munshi regresses their labor market outcome in the U.S. on current and lagged 
rainfall in the Mexican origin community, controlling for individual and year fixed effects. In a 
supporting regression, he substitutes outcomes in Mexico as the dependent variable. 
The results are reported in Figure 1. The MMP data that Munshi uses includes 
information on the residential location (U.S. or Mexico) and the corresponding labor market 
outcome each year, over multiple years, for around 200 individuals in each of the surveyed 
Mexican communities. With employment in the U.S. as the dependent variable (and the sample 
restricted to person-years in the U.S.), the coefficients on lagged rainfall are negative and 
significant; notice that they get larger in magnitude and more significant as we go further back in 
time. In contrast, with employment in Mexico as the dependent variable (and the sample 
restricted to person-years in Mexico), the coefficients on current and recent rainfall are positive 
and significant, weakening as we go further back.  
These results can be interpreted as follows. When rainfall in the Mexican origin 
community is relatively low, local employment is relatively low, hence the positive coefficient 
on current and lagged rainfall. This negative shock (remember we have individual fixed effects, 
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so everything is in terms of deviations from the mean) encourages individuals to move. The 
MMP data indicate, as expected, that a negative rainfall shock in Mexico results in an immediate 
increase in the number of migrants to the U.S. Over time, these migrants get established and 
build a reputation with their employers. This allows them to provide information and job 
referrals to individuals from their origin community in Mexico who are located in the U.S., 
explaining why low rainfall in Mexico results in positive labor market outcomes in the U.S. with 
a long lag. If we replaced lagged rainfall with lagged migration flows as regressors, and 
instrumented for these flows with rainfall, we could estimate the magnitude of the network 
effect. Munshi finds that these magnitudes are large; if the networks were shut down but 
migration flows remained unchanged, unemployment would increase from 4% to 10%. 
Complementing this finding, the prevalence of preferred (more remunerative) non-agricultural 
jobs would decline from 51% to 32%. 
The reduced-form results reported in Figure 1 provide credible evidence that community 
networks improve the outcomes of their members. Local rainfall in Mexican communities far 
from the border has no impact on the U.S. labor market. However, it has a strong effect on the 
number of migrants, and these migrants, in turn, improve outcomes for their network-members 
years later when they are established. One alternative interpretation of Figure 1 is that it reflects 
an individual experience effect; the individuals who moved in response to the negative rainfall 
shock years ago are now doing better themselves. However, when Munshi restricts the sample to 
individuals who arrived recently in the U.S., he finds that the estimated network effects are even 
larger. This is exactly what the theory would predict, since newcomers to the foreign labor 
market benefit the most from referrals. 
The preceding example provides a general framework for identifying network effects. 
Panel data (and fixed effects) allow the econometrician to control for selection into the network. 
Rainfall shocks in the origin location generate exogenous variation in the size and the vintage of 
the network in the destination labor market. Finally, the theory is used to place additional 
restrictions on the data; as predicted, recent arrivals benefit more from the network, while 
established migrants contribute disproportionately to the network. Munshi’s application is 
exceptionally well suited to testing for network effects because both panel data and a clean 
source of variation in network size (by vintage) is available. It is, however, possible to identify 
network effects even when this is not the case, as long as there is exogenous variation across 
networks or communities, by deriving and testing additional predictions from the theory. The 
examples that follow show how this can be done. This approach has also been followed by the 
emerging literature on community networks in economics; e.g. Luke and Munshi (2006), 
Magruder (2010), Beaman (2012), Wang (2012). 
While community networks may provide useful benefits to their members, a recurring 
message of this paper is that they can give rise to inefficiencies of their own. One such 
inefficiency is paradoxically a consequence of the very mechanism that gives community 
networks their strength; while strong social ties may solve commitment problems within 
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communities, capable individuals outside these communities will be left out. Banerjee and 
Munshi (2004) show that this can result in a substantial misallocation of resources in a paper that 
predates the misallocation literature in macroeconomics. 
Banerjee and Munshi’s analysis is situated in the South Indian town of Tirupur, a 
production cluster that supplies 70% of India’s knitted garment exports. The textile industry in 
Tirupur was initially controlled by a local trading community. However, after a prolonged period 
of labor unrest in the 1960s, it was taken over by the Gounders, a community whose previous 
economic activity had been confined to agriculture (Swaminathan and Jeyaranjan 1994). For the 
next 20 years, the industry continued to be dominated by the Gounders and catered almost 
exclusively to the domestic market. Starting from the mid-1980s, however, the export of knitted 
garments from Tirupur started to grow extremely rapidly, and by the early 1990s the growth rate 
exceeded 50%. This generated an influx of entrepreneurs from outside Tirupur. In 1996, when 
Banerjee and Munshi conducted a survey of firms in the industry, collecting retrospective panel 
data on investment and production for each firm, about half the entrepreneurs were Gounders, 
while the rest belonged to traditional business communities drawn from all over the country. 
Banerjee and Munshi exploit this heterogeneity in the sociological composition of Tirupur’s 
production cluster to identify a mismatch between (network-based) credit and entrepreneurial 
ability in this industry. 
Two stylized facts uncovered by their survey motivate the theory and the empirical 
strategy used to identify misallocation. First, as shown in Figure 2A, the Gounders hold more 
capital stock than the Outsiders at all levels of experience. Adjusting for differences in 
production, the Gounders use roughly twice as much capital per unit of production than the 
Outsiders. Second, as shown in Figure 2B, exports grow faster for the Outsiders than for the 
Gounders at all levels of experience. Let the export trajectory be determined by entrepreneurial 
ability and capital, with the standard assumption that these inputs are complements. If the export 
trajectory is steeper for the Outsiders despite having lower capital stock, they must have higher 
ability. But if ability and capital are complements, and the Outsiders have higher ability, then the 
Gounders will only invest more if the cost of capital is lower for them.  
The fact that different communities effectively face different interest rates implies that 
credit does not cross community lines. The Gounders are a wealthy landowning community and 
garment manufacturing was their first foray outside agriculture. Given that they have few 
alternative uses for their capital, unlike the Outsiders from well-established and diversified 
business communities, it makes sense that interest rates are low for them. The Gounder credit 
network presumably supported entrepreneurship within the community by channeling (cheap) 
capital to capable individuals. The inefficiency that Banerjee and Munshi identify is that this 
capital failed to reach more capable individuals outside the Gounder community. 
One alternative explanation for these empirical findings, which does not imply that 
resources are allocated inefficiently or that interest rates vary across communities, is that ability 
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and capital are substitutes in this industry. The Outsiders, who are endowed with higher ability 
on average for historical reasons or due to selection pressures, would then invest less, but could 
still end up with a steeper export trajectory than the Gounders. To examine this possibility, 
Banerjee and Munshi look within each community. Among the Gounders and, separately, among 
the Outsiders, firms who invest more have a steeper export trajectory, consistent with the 
assumption that ability and capital are complements. It is only across communities that less 
capitalized firms grow faster. Variation in investment and production across communities, 
together with restrictions from the theory, allow us to infer that community networks are active 
(without actually observing these networks) and that they result in a misallocation of resources. 
 
Community Networks and Group Mobility 
Munshi’s analysis of Mexican migrant networks describes the inner workings of a remarkable 
institution. Passel, Cohn and Gonzales-Barrera (2012) estimate 12 million Mexican-born people 
living in the United States in 2011, about half of whom are unauthorized. As noted, migration 
from Mexico tends to be recurrent – the typical migration spell in the MMP data is four years. 
This implies that many millions of Mexicans must form the pool that supplies short-term labor to 
the United States. Established members of the network provide referrals and support new arrivals 
from this pool, with each migrant typically matched with a completely different group from his 
community from one trip to the next. Strong pre-existing community ties are needed for the 
network to function so well without long-term interactions between individuals at the 
destination. While these ties may give individuals access to the U.S. labor market, with its higher 
wages, it is worth noting that the community networks they support have locked their members 
into low-skill occupations (and low levels of human capital) for generations. From a growth 
perspective, what matters is occupational mobility and investments in human capital, and while 
this may not have been achieved in the Mexican case, community networks have permanently 
changed the circumstances of their members in many other contexts. 
 I have already discussed how caste-based networks supported the movement of their 
members from agriculture into skilled industrial occupations during British colonial rule in India. 
Similar patterns of occupational mobility have been documented for Europeans who arrived in 
the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While German bakers and 
British miners may have carried their traditional occupations with them, most arriving migrants 
found niches in new occupations (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). These patterns of 
occupational mobility continue to this day as evidenced by the rapidly growing literature on 
community-based migration to the U.S. (e.g. Kotkin 1992, Fairlie and Meyer 1996, McKenzie 
and Rapoport 2007, 2010, Patel and Vella 2013).  
The main challenge when an individual attempts to enter a new occupation is that he is an 
outsider without connections to employers, workers, buyers, or suppliers. What community 
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networks do is to substitute for these individual connections, allowing their members to help 
each other and bootstrap their way out of traditional occupations into more remunerative 
occupations. It is tempting to infer from the variation in levels of migration across origin 
communities and the occupational clustering that is typically observed at the destination that 
migrants move as a group, typically into new occupations. However, additional evidence is 
needed to support this claim. For example, levels of migration were much higher from southern 
counties where labor intensive plantation crops were grown during the Great Migration. One 
explanation for the higher level of migration, discussed below, is that black networks formed in 
plantation counties, supporting the movement of groups of individuals to northern destinations. 
An alternative explanation is that economic and social conditions were disadvantageous to blacks 
in the plantation counties, leading to the independent departure by many individuals. To identify 
group mobility, supported by underlying networks, I will once again exploit exogenous variation 
in community characteristics, together with restrictions from the theory. The following examples 
show how this can be done in very different contexts. 
 The first example that I discuss describes how a historically disadvantaged caste moved 
from agriculture into the international diamond business, with the support of an underlying 
community network, over the course of a single generation. India does not produce rough 
diamonds. The rough diamonds are imported, for the most part from Antwerp, then cut and 
polished in domestic factories, before being sold on the Mumbai market to foreign buyers or 
shipped directly abroad. Most exporters buy their rough diamonds in Antwerp. A packet of rough 
diamonds costs thousands of dollars, so diamond exporters (without deep pockets) typically 
receive the packets on supplier credit. The commitment problem that arises here is that the 
exporter will not repay the supplier if there is little chance he will do business with him in the 
future. 
 One solution to this commitment problem is to write formal contracts, but such contracts 
are difficult to verify in the diamond industry. A second solution, which is only available to well-
established wealthy firms, is to set up a branch in Antwerp and operate simultaneously as an 
exporter and a rough diamond supplier. The permanent presence of these firms in Antwerp 
allows them to build up a reputation in the market and to buy rough diamonds on credit from 
other suppliers (for their export business) when the need arises.  A third solution, which is 
chosen by most exporters, is to visit Antwerp for a few days each month and to use their 
community network to access rough diamonds on credit from a variety of suppliers. Firms who 
follow this strategy establish long-term relations with a small number of suppliers. When they 
need to buy rough diamonds from other suppliers, members of the community who have close 
ties with those suppliers stand guarantor for them.  The recipients of these referrals will repay the 
rough diamond suppliers, even if they do not expect to do business in the future, because they 
will face severe social sanctions and lose the support of the entire network if they renege on their 
obligations.  
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  The preceding discussion indicates that a first-generation exporter could operate 
profitably in the diamond industry with his community network substituting for the parental 
support (connections and resources) that entrepreneurs from established business families 
receive. Munshi (2011) examines the dynamics of such a network. As it grows stronger, it will 
attract more first-generation businessmen into the industry. If there is positive selection on ability 
into this industry, the marginal ability of entrants into the network, measured by their educational 
attainment, will decline over time. The novel insight from this dynamic theory of group mobility 
is that once they form, new networks will strengthen most rapidly in communities with the worst 
outside options (least remunerative traditional occupations). It follows that inter-generational 
occupational mobility will be correspondingly greater in those communities. 
Outside options → change in network size → inter-generational mobility 
 Munshi takes advantage of an exogenous shock to the world diamond industry – the 
discovery of massive diamond deposits in Australia’s Argyle mines in 1979 – to test this theory. 
Two traditional business communities, the Palanpuris and the Marwaris, initially controlled the 
business end of the diamond industry, leaving the cutting and polishing to a lower caste of 
agricultural laborers known as the Kathiawaris. The story told in industry circles is that some of 
the Palanpuri businessmen, who had established branches in Antwerp by the time of the supply 
shock, helped their trusted Kathiawari labor contractors enter the business by supplying rough 
diamonds to them. Once the initial group had entered business, they encouraged more of their 
community members to follow, and today the Kathiawaris are a significant presence, with 
hundreds of firms, in the Indian diamond industry. This variation in the social background of 
communities in the industry is used to test the theory of group mobility. 
  Figure 3 nonparametrically describes the relationship between the business background 
of diamond exporters, obtained from a survey of nearly 800 firms conducted in 2004-2005, and 
the year of establishment of their firms. While there is a mild decline in the fraction of Marwaris 
and Palanpuris who report that their father was a businessman over time, this decline is 
particularly steep for the Kathiawaris from the late 1970’s onwards. Although 70% of the 
Kathiawaris who entered the industry in 1970, before the supply shock, report that their father 
was a businessman, this statistic declines steadily and drops below 20% by 2000. Munshi shows 
that most of the occupational mobility documented for entering Kathiawari entrepreneurs in 
Figure 3 was driven by the dramatic shift out of agriculture in this community over a single 
generation.   
 The theory of group mobility generates specific predictions for the selection of new 
entrants into business, across communities, as underlying networks strengthen. Figure 3 provides 
empirical support for these predictions; there is greater occupational mobility in the historically 
disadvantaged Kathiawari community, reflected by the increasing share of first-generation 
businessmen, over time. However, an alternative explanation for these patterns, which does not 
require networks to be active, is that outside options (returns in the traditional occupation) were 
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declining relatively steeply over time for the Kathiawaris. This would have encouraged 
individual Kathiawaris to move independently, with an accompanying increase in the proportion 
of first-generation businessmen, but without the support of a community network these new 
entrants would have fared increasingly poorly in the diamond business. 
 Munshi provides two pieces of evidence supporting the hypothesis that an underlying 
network supported the movement of the Kathiawaris as a group into the diamond business. First, 
he uses administrative data on exports, available annually for 95% of the surveyed firms over the 
1995-2004 period (or as long as they had been exporting) to show that Kathiawari firms grow at 
least as fast as firms from other communities on average. This result is inconsistent with the 
alternative (non-network) explanation provided above, and is obtained despite the fact that 
entering Kathiawari entrepreneurs are increasingly disadvantaged over time (more likely to be 
first-generation businessmen and less educated). Indeed, once we control for compositional 
change in the industry with firm fixed effects, the export trajectory is significantly steeper for the 
Kathiawaris than it is for the other communities. There is a community-level force that is 
improving the performance of Kathiawari firms relatively rapidly over time, and our 
interpretation of this force is that it reflects the support that is being provided by a rapidly 
strengthening community network. 
Providing direct support for this hypothesis, the second piece of evidence that Munshi 
provides is that the frequency of intra-industry (and intra-caste) marriages, which reduce 
commitment problems within the network, increases relatively steeply for the Kathiawaris. 
Almost none of the early Kathiawari entrants who established their firms before 1975 married 
within the industry. By 2004, however, 50% of the entrants were marrying within the industry, 
surpassing the corresponding marriage rates for the Palanpuris and Marwaris, which remained 
roughly constant over time. These inter-community differences are robust to including the 
number of firms, by community, in the industry to account for the size of the marriage pool at 
each point in time, and are also obtained for the entrepreneurs’ children. Complementing the 
marriage results, Kathiawaris are more likely to organize their production in ways that leave 
them more dependent on the network; i.e. they are less likely to have a branch in Antwerp, and 
these differences in organizational structure widen over time. 
The preceding example exploited variation in outside options (returns to traditional 
occupations) across communities, together with restrictions from the theory, to show that 
individuals moved as a group into business. The next example takes the same approach, except 
that communities now vary with respect to their social connectedness, and are based on 
geography rather than kinship. The setting for this example is the American South in the decades 
after Emancipation. Chay and Munshi’s (2014) objective is to assess whether and where African 
Americans were able to overcome centuries of social dislocation and form new networks once 
they were free. 
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The point of departure for Chay and Munshi’s analysis is the observation that black 
spatial proximity varied substantially across southern counties, during and after slavery, 
depending on the crops that were grown in the local area. Where labor intensive plantation crops 
such as tobacco, cotton, rice, and sugarcane were grown, blacks worked (and lived) in close 
proximity to each other. Where crops such as wheat and corn were grown, blacks were dispersed 
more widely. Restricted social interaction across plantations, and forced separation, would have 
prevented black networks from forming during slavery. Black networks could have formed 
without restriction after Emancipation, but their size would have been determined by spatial 
proximity; i.e. the connectedness of the population, in the local area. Greater connectedness 
would have supported higher levels of cooperation, resulting in larger networks. These larger 
networks would, in turn, have allowed blacks to work more effectively as a group to achieve 
common objectives in the decades after Emancipation.  
Southern blacks had two significant opportunities to work together at this time. First, 
blacks were able to vote and to elect their own leaders during and just after Reconstruction, 
1870-1890. Second, blacks were able to leave the South and find jobs in northern cities during 
the Great Migration, 1916-1930. Based on the theory, more connected populations would have 
supported the formation of larger networks of black activists during Reconstruction and larger 
networks of black workers moving together to northern cities during the Great Migration. This, 
in turn, would have given rise to greater overall political participation and migration.  
Population connectedness → network size → political participation and migration 
While a positive relationship between population connectedness and particular outcomes during 
Reconstruction and the Great Migration is consistent with the presence of underlying 
(unobserved) black networks, other explanations are available. For example, racial conflict could 
have been greater in counties where labor intensive plantation crops were grown, encouraging 
individual black voters to turn out during Reconstruction and to move independently to northern 
cities during the Great Migration. Alternatively, adverse economic conditions in these counties 
could have encouraged greater migration, without requiring a role for black cooperation. Chay 
and Munshi’s strategy to identify the presence of underlying networks takes advantage of the 
additional prediction of their theory, which is that networks will only form above a threshold 
level of population connectedness. There should thus be no association between the outcomes of 
interest – political participation and migration – and population connectedness up to a threshold 
and a positive association thereafter. 
 Figure 4 reports the relationship between population connectedness and (separately) 
black political participation and migration. Population connectedness is measured by the fraction 
of cultivated land in the county that was allocated to labor intensive plantation crops in 1890, 
midway between Reconstruction and the Great Migration, adjusting for differences in labor 
intensity across those crops. Black political participation is measured by the number of 
Republican votes in the 1872 presidential election, since blacks would have voted almost 
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exclusively for the Republican Party (the party of the Union) at that time (Morrison 1987). The 
black migration measure is derived from inter-censal changes in the black population between 
1910 and 1930 (recall that the Great Migration commenced in 1916), adjusting for natural 
changes due to births and deaths. It appears from Figure 4 that the specific nonlinearity implied 
by the theory, characterized by a slope discontinuity at a threshold, is obtained for both political 
participation and migration.      
 Chay and Munshi construct a statistical estimator that allows them to formally test 
whether the data generating process underlying a particular outcome is consistent with the 
theory. Based on this test they verify that both relationships reported in Figure 4 are consistent 
with the theory. In addition, they show formally that the specific nonlinearity implied by their 
theory of network formation is also obtained for the following outcomes: (i) the election of black 
leaders during Reconstruction, which complements the pattern of voting, (ii) church 
congregation size in black denominations, which is the most direct available measure of network 
size, and (iii) the clustering of black migrants in northern destination cities. In contrast, this 
nonlinearity is not obtained for (i) Republican votes after Reconstruction when blacks were 
effectively disfranchised, (ii) black migration prior to 1916, (iii) white migration, and (iv) church 
congregation size in non-black denominations. 
 No single alternative can explain the specific nonlinear relationship between population 
connectedness and outcomes associated with underlying networks, obtained for blacks alone at 
particular points in time. The nonlinear relationship that is obtained for black church 
congregation size and the clustering of black migrants in northern destinations, in particular, 
provides direct support for the hypothesis that blacks were able to work together to achieve 
common objectives in counties where population connectedness exceeded a threshold. If black 
migration decisions were based on factors that did not include a coordination externality, then 
the probability of moving to the same destination would not track migration levels so closely.  
  The two examples discussed in this section document the role played by community 
networks in occupational transitions of great importance. Over one million blacks (one-tenth the 
black population at the time) moved from the rural south to northern cities during the initial 
phase of the Great Migration, running from 1916 to 1930 (Marks 1983). This is one of the largest 
internal migrations in history, and although anecdotal evidence suggests that community 
networks linking southern counties to northern cities did emerge (Gottlieb 1987, Grossman 
1989), Chay and Munshi are the first to identify and quantify network effects in the Great 
Migration. Their estimates of these network effects are large; for example, over half of the 
migrants to the north came from the third of southern blacks who lived in the most connected 
counties, while less than fifteen percent came from the third in the least connected counties. 
 The movement of Kathiawaris from agriculture into business, described earlier in this 
section, is also an occupational transition of considerable importance. The diamond industry 
accounts for roughly 14% of India’s total merchandize exports and has competed with textiles, 
and more recently with computer software, as the country’s top export industry over the past 
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three decades. It is estimated that approximately one thousand Indian diamond export firms 
employ over a million workers. The diamond industry is associated with a high degree of 
community networking throughout the world because of the difficulty in enforcing legal 
contracts (Coleman 1988, Richman 2006). Apart from their static role in solving commitment 
problems, Munshi shows that community networks have also supported an extremely high level 
of inter-generational occupational mobility in the Indian diamond industry. This role is not 
restricted to this industry. Damodaran (2008) documents the emergence of a new business class 
in post-colonial India, drawn from a select group of agricultural castes and from castes that 
historically dominated the bureaucracy and various white-collar professions. Community (caste) 
networks very likely played a major role in these occupational transitions as well.  
 
Community Networks and Misallocation 
We have already seen how inefficiencies can arise when community networks are active because 
resources fail to cross community boundaries. While community networks will support the 
economic activity and the mobility of their members, outsiders will be shut out. The discussion 
that follows highlights a second inefficiency that arises within these networks. Community 
networks will support the mobility of groups of individuals, but they will restrict the mobility of 
individual members. 
 Consider a rural network providing mutual insurance to its members. Households with 
migrant members will have reduced access to these networks for two reasons. First, migrants 
cannot be as easily punished by the network, and their family back home now has superior 
outside options (in the event that the household is excluded from the network). It follows that 
households with migrants cannot credibly commit to honoring their future obligations at the 
same level as households without migrants. Second, an information problem arises if the 
migrant’s income cannot be observed. If the household is treated as a collective unit by the 
network, it always has an incentive to misreport its urban income so that transfers flow in its 
direction. If the resulting loss in network insurance exceeds the income gain, then large wage 
gaps could persist without generating a flow of workers to higher-wage areas. This misallocation 
of labor is paradoxically amplified when the informal insurance networks work exceptionally 
well because rural households then have more to lose by sending their members to the city. 
 One way to circumvent these restrictions on mobility would be for the members of the 
rural community to move to the city as a group. Members of the group could monitor each other 
and enforce collective punishments, solving the information and commitment problems 
described above. They would also help each other find jobs at the destination. A limitation of this 
strategy is that a sufficiently large (common) shock is needed to jump-start the new network at 
the destination and such group-level opportunities occur relatively infrequently. A second 
strategy to reduce the information and enforcement problems that restrict mobility is to migrate 
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temporarily. The principal limitation of this strategy is that it will not fill the large number of 
jobs that require firm-specific or task-specific learning. Both strategies described above are used 
by rural households to facilitate mobility, as discussed at some length in this paper. Individuals 
will nevertheless be discouraged from migrating permanently and the labor market will not clear, 
potentially giving rise to large rural-urban wage gaps. As noted, this misallocation is exacerbated 
when rural networks are well-functioning. This is the basis for Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2014) 
claim that exceptionally well-functioning caste-based rural insurance networks, together with the 
absence of formal insurance, are responsible for the exceptionally large rural-urban wage gap in 
India. 
 The most direct test of this hypothesis, in line with the examples discussed earlier, would 
be to compare migration rates in populations with access to rural insurance networks of different 
quality (size and connectedness). However, an exogenous source of variation in the quality of 
insurance networks across castes is unavailable. What Munshi and Rosenzweig do instead is to 
look within the caste-community and theoretically identify which households benefit more (less) 
from caste-based insurance. They then proceed to test whether those households are less (more) 
likely to have migrant members. 
 When an insurance network is active, the income generated by its members is pooled in 
each period and then distributed on the basis of a pre-specified sharing rule. This smooths 
consumption over time, making risk-averse individuals better off. The literature on mutual 
insurance is concerned with ex post risk-sharing, taking the size of the network and the income 
sharing rule as given. To derive the connection between networks in the rural origin and rural-
urban migration, however, it is necessary to take a step back and derive the ex ante participation 
decision and the income sharing rule. The rule that is chosen in equilibrium determines which 
households choose to stay. Munshi and Rosenzweig’s first theoretical result is that the income 
sharing rule that maximizes the surplus generated by the insurance network will involve some 
amount of redistribution. This implies that relatively wealthy households within their caste 
benefit less from the network and so will be more likely to have migrant members. Their second 
theoretical result is that households who face greater rural income risk, and therefore benefit 
more from the insurance network, will be less likely to have migrant members. The latter result 
would not be obtained if the network treated migrants and the rest of their family that remained 
in the village independently. It would also not be obtained if rural insurance networks did not 
offer substantial benefits; by not sending their members to the city, households forego 
substantially higher income and the gain from income diversification. 
 Using a variety of data sources and empirical techniques, Munshi and Rosenzweig obtain 
evidence consistent with both predictions of their theory. They then proceed to estimate the 
structural parameters of the model. Counter-factual simulations that quantify the effect of formal 
insurance on migration indicate that a 50% improvement in risk-sharing for households with 
migrant members (who lose network insurance) would increase the migration rate from 4% to 
9%. In contrast, halving the rural-urban wage gap, which is currently as high as 20% in India, 
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would reduce migration by just one percentage point. The analysis of migration in economics has 
traditionally focused on average differences in wages at the origin and the destination. As 
discussed above, a literature documenting the role played by networks in supporting migration is 
rapidly emerging. Munshi and Rosenzweig’s analysis adds a new perspective to the relationship 
between networks and migration, showing how networks at the origin can constrain the 
movement of individual members.  
Migration is dampened in the preceding analysis because it results in a loss in origin-
network services, not because movers face explicit sanctions or restrictions. There are certain 
circumstances, however, under which networks will actively restrict the movement of their 
members. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider an urban network providing job referrals for 
its members. Recall that Munshi (2003) shows that larger networks are more effective. When a 
member of the network leaves the market that the network operates in to find a job in a different 
location or a different occupation, he will not internalize the cost he consequently imposes on the 
rest of the network through his departure. This cost will be especially large when multiple 
networks are competing for scarce jobs. Social sanctions will have little effect once the 
individual has moved on and under these circumstances it may be optimal for the community to 
place ex ante restrictions on mobility. These restrictions could take the form of a culture that 
builds loyalty to the community and a strong identification with traditional lifestyles. This type 
of culture is often associated with farming and blue-collar communities where cooperation was 
historically important; e.g. Elder and Conger (2000), Gans (1962), Kornblum (1977). 
 While a culture that restricts mobility may have been welfare enhancing when it was put 
in place, its persistence can result in a dynamic inefficiency if the returns to new occupations 
increase sufficiently. There is a common perception that farming and blue-collar communities 
stubbornly resist change. This perception has even made its way into the media, as for example, 
the portrayal of the Boston-Irish working class in the film Goodwill Hunting or Polish 
dockworkers on cable TV shows like The Wire. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) provide a more 
formal analysis of such resistance to change in Mumbai’s working class communities, even as 
the returns to white-collar occupations grew with the restructuring of the Indian economy in the 
1990s.  
 I have already described how caste networks established niches in urban labor markets 
during the colonial period and how these networks maintained their position in the market over 
many generations. These networks typically formed in working class (blue-collar) occupations, 
which provided stable employment with relatively high wages from the 19th and through much of 
the 20th century. This situation changed dramatically in the 1990s, with the growth of the 
corporate sector in cities like Mumbai where the traditional working class jobs had been 
simultaneously declining over time. Adult workers were already locked into the occupations they 
had selected. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) examine occupational mobility in this environment 
by studying the schooling choices made by their children. 
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 Schooling in Mumbai can be in English or Marathi (the local language). English 
schooling channels students into white-collar jobs, while Marathi schooling, which is less 
expensive, channels them into working class jobs. The increase in the returns to white-collar 
occupations, which was effectively an increase in the returns to English schooling, resulted in a 
shift into English schools from 1990 onwards. However, this response to economic change 
varied substantially across castes and by gender. Among the boys, schooling choice was strongly 
determined by the fraction of adult men (the preceding generation) from the student’s caste in 
working class jobs, net of parental and household characteristics. This inter-generational 
persistence did not weaken across successive cohorts entering school over the 1990s, even as the 
returns to English grew over time, providing a network-based explanation for the absence of 
convergence in schooling choice across castes. In contrast, there is no inter-generational 
persistence for the girls. Women did not benefit from the traditional working class networks. 
While girls from (male) working class castes also start with lower rates of English schooling in 
1990, unlike the boys, convergence across castes is complete by 2000.  
 
Towards a Theory of Network-Based Growth 
The preceding sections describe a world in which community networks support their members in 
a variety of ways when markets are incomplete. In addition to these services in the immediate 
term, networks also play a dynamic role, supporting the permanent movement of groups of 
individuals from the community across space and occupations. However, this community-based 
support comes at a cost. Competent individuals without access to a community network are shut 
out of jobs and economic activities. For those individuals with a network, there is a different 
cost, which is that independent mobility is discouraged. The relationship between networks and 
mobility, a key ingredient in the process of development, is thus complex. Despite this 
complexity, there might be substantial gains to incorporating networks in models of growth, as 
discussed below. 
 When credit markets are imperfect and there is a fixed cost to investing in human capital, 
or when inherited (parental) human capital is occupation-specific, families can get locked into 
occupations from one generation to the next. Families in low-skill occupations with low levels of 
human capital stay poor, while families in high-skill occupations with correspondingly high 
levels of human capital stay wealthy, despite being endowed with the same level of ability on 
average (Galor and Zeira 1993, Banerjee and Newman 1993, Maoz and Moav 1999, Hassler and 
Mora 2000, Mookherjee and Ray 2003). A strong implication of what is sometimes known as the 
“new classical” growth model is that initial wealth will have long-term consequences, resulting 
in occupational traps and permanent wealth inequality. Once we add networks to the mix, 
however, the outcome is not so certain. A community-based network effectively substitutes for 
parental wealth and human capital, allowing groups of individuals to bootstrap their way into 
new occupations over the course of a single generation. What matters now for long-term 
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outcomes is not just initial household wealth, but also the social structure and the distribution of 
shocks (both positive and negative) across communities and over time. 
 Consider a country such as India, where the population is stratified into large, 
cohesive, communities. These communities are well positioned to support well-connected and 
well-functioning networks, and so the development process in such a country will be 
characterized by groups of individuals, belonging to the same community, making occupational 
transitions. Large common shocks will be needed to generate movement, but once a transition is 
initiated, it will involve large numbers of individuals. In countries with smaller communities, 
there may be greater individual flexibility, but transitions that involve a major mobilization of 
resources, such as the move from trade to capital-intensive manufacturing, may be difficult to 
achieve. Growth may thus be rapid initially in these countries, but the long-term outcome is less 
clear. A complete characterization of the relationship between networks and growth might well 
go a long way in explaining differences in the development trajectory across countries, or 
regions within countries. 
Growth theory has always been responsive to advances in microeconomic theory. The 
classical growth model, with its prediction of convergence, was based on neoclassical micro-
foundations; in particular, perfect markets. When these strong assumptions began to be relaxed 
by micro-economists in the 1980s, the new growth model, based on credit market imperfections, 
followed with its predictions for the persistence of inequality. Given recent advances in the 
economics of networks at the micro level, it may be time for an augmented growth model that 
incorporates networks.  
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Table 1: Percent of Loans by Purpose and Source
Purpose: investment operating expenses contingencies
consumption 
expenses all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Source:
Bank 64.11 80.80 27.58 25.12 64.61
Caste 16.97 6.07 42.65 23.12 13.87
Friends 2.11 11.29 2.31 4.33 7.84
Employer 5.08 0.49 21.15 15.22 5.62
Moneylender 11.64 1.27 5.05 31.85 7.85
Other 0.02 0.07 1.27 0.37 0.22
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Munshi and Rosenzweig (2014)
Data are from the 1982 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) .
Statistics are weighted by the value of the loan and sample weights.
Investment includes land, house, business, etc.
Operating expenses are for agricultural production.
Contingencies include marriage, illness, etc.
